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Abstract 
The article investigates the sceptical challenge from an information-theoretic perspective. Its 
main goal is to articulate and defend the view that either informational scepticism is radical, 
but then it is epistemologically innocuous because redundant; or it is moderate, but then 
epistemologically beneficial because useful. In order to pursue this cooptation strategy, the 
article is divided into seven sections. Section one sets up the problem. Section two introduces 
Borel numbers as a convenient way to refer uniformly to (the data that individuate) different 
possible worlds. Section three adopts the Hamming distance between Borel numbers as a 
metric to calculate the distance between possible worlds. In sections four and five, radical and 
moderate informational scepticism are analysed using Borel numbers and Hamming 
distances, and shown to be either harmless (extreme form) or actually fruitful (moderate 
form). Section six further clarifies the approach by replying to some potential objections. In 
the conclusion, the Peircean nature of the overall approach is briefly discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Sceptics have never enjoyed a good press. Indeed, only sophists seem to have been bashed by 
philosophers more regularly and systematically. How unfair. Sceptical challenges provide the 
starting points of many philosophical investigations; young epistemologists sharpen their 
dialectical teeth on sceptical debates; more than one academic career has been made out of 
alleged refutations of some sceptical position; and teaching philosophy without dealing with 
sceptical doubts would be like cooking without spices.  
 There are intuitive reasons why no brand of scepticism appears to be welcome. Some 
are more historical. They will not occupy us in the following pages, although I shall briefly 
return to them in the conclusion. Here, suffice to recall that, insofar as scepticism seeks to 
undermine all certainties – what Sextus Empiricus referred to as dogma1 – it is a disruptive 
force, which is at loggerheads with intellectual conservatism and intolerant religious 
doctrines.
2
 Crusaders and fundamentalists of all sorts inevitably loathe serious doubters.  
 Some other reasons are more theoretical. They usually concern the degrees
3
 of 
certainty to which an epistemic agent a (whether an individual or a group of agents, i.e., a 
                                                 
1
 In the Greek tradition, dogma are fixed and untouchable beliefs and philosophical dogmatism is any non-
Pyrrhonian philosophy advancing positive theories. 
2
 True, some uses of scepticism have sometimes represented a background condition for a fideistic defence of 
religious faith (Floridi (2002), Popkin (2003)). But these are exceptions, which bear only a negative relation to 
the epistemological problems originally raised by scepticism. They stressed the weakness of human knowledge 
only in order to redirect the interest of the audience towards Christian faith, and hence to foster behaviour 
consistent with it. The emphasis was not on the nature of knowledge, but on the ethical attitude to be taken with 
respect to revelation and Christ‟s teachings. 
3
 The qualification is introduced here in order to take into account epistemologically fuzzy statements such as “I 
am almost certain (sure) that p” or “I am pretty certain (sure) that p”, or “I am not completely certain (sure) that 
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multi-agent system, it does not matter, so I shall not differentiate between the two cases in the 
rest of this article) may be justifiably entitled, when assessing a‟s knowledge of the external 
world.
4
 Thus, most of the anti-sceptical literature, at least from Augustine onwards, has 
focused on the possibility of showing that a can indeed reach irrefutable certainties, and then 
on arguing, from Descartes onwards, that a can successfully exploit at least some of these 
certainties in order to discriminate between bad beliefs that must be discarded (Descartes‟ 
„rotten apples‟, see Descartes (1984), 7:481), and good beliefs (the „good apples‟) that may 
constitute knowledge, given the right circumstances and proper further qualifications. This is 
the classic perspective from which I shall approach the sceptical challenge. There are, 
however, three points where my contribution will depart from other, more orthodox lines of 
reasoning.  
 First, I shall focus on information, rather than on beliefs or knowledge. Second, I will 
be concerned with informativeness, rather than with certainty. And finally, I will seek to co-
opt moderate scepticism as a valuable ally in the search for information about the world, 
rather than refute all kinds of scepticism as a disease, or endorse it wholeheartedly and 
unreservedly as a panacea. Each point deserves a brief clarification. 
 Information – in the factual, semantic sense of well-formed, meaningful and truthful 
data about some topic (Floridi (2010)) – is a weaker concept than knowledge. This is so not 
least because information does not require what is a necessary feature of knowledge, namely 
a sufficient dose of the relevant kind of rational support, be this, for example, a satisfactory 
degree of justification, warranty, explanation, or account. An agent a might be informed that i 
– e.g., a might hold the information that a playing card is indeed the King of Spades – 
                                                                                                                                                        
p”. The reader who objects to the possibility of degrees of certainty may replace them with only two binary 
values without any consequence for the rest of the article. 
4
 I have discussed mathematical scepticism elsewhere, see Floridi (1998b), Floridi (2000), and Floridi (2004a).  
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without yet knowing that i because a lacks any further support in favour of i. You are still 
informed that i – to the extent that you can successfully use i, convey i, sell i, etc.– even if 
you merely guessed correctly that i and cannot explain or justify why i for the life of you. 
Information is not subject to the problems notoriously caused by epistemic luck. 
 Regarding the second point, it is useful to focus on the more impoverished concept of 
information, rather than on the richer one of knowledge, because this clarifies that the 
sceptical challenge concerns the empirical truth, and hence the informativeness of i, not the 
kinds or degrees of support that a might enjoy in holding that i (this soon turns into some 
version of the Gettier problem), or the information network that may account for i. Let me 
explain. Information goes hand in hand with unpredictability. More precisely, the Inverse 
Relationship Principle (IRP), as Barwise labelled it, states that there is an inverse relation 
between the probability of i and how much semantic information is carried by i. Nowadays, 
one often translates IRP modally, by stating that the semantic information conveyed by i is 
equivalent to the set of all possible worlds – or, more cautiously, to the set of all the 
descriptions of the relevant possible states of the actual world – that are excluded by, or are 
inconsistent with, i. So, if a holds some content (i.e., some well-formed and meaningful data) 
c about some topic t, the informativeness of c is inversely related to the number of possible 
worlds in which c is true. If c is true in all possible worlds (necessary truth) then it follows 
from IRP that c is not informative.
5
 If c is true in no possible world (necessary falsehood) 
then I have argued (Floridi (2004b)) that, in this case too, c is not informative. In either case, 
the sceptical challenge regarding our information about the external world does not apply. 
The scope of IRP is limited to only possibly-true content: if c is true only in some possible 
worlds, then establishing in which ones makes c either informative or disinformative. It 
                                                 
5
 See Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1953), reprinted in Bar-Hillel (1964). Note that this is the source of Hintikka‟s 
scandal of deduction, see D'Agostino and Floridi (2009). 
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follows that the sceptical challenge is about whether one can treat some content that seems to 
be information as actually being information. Is c = i ? The question is rephrased by the 
sceptic in the following way: how can you establish whether c is informative or 
disinformative with respect to t in a possible world W? That is, how can you establish 
whether c tells you something true or false about t in W? We shall see that the sceptic 
suggests that you cannot – mind, not that it is not – and hence that you should withhold your 
commitment regarding the informativeness of c. Assuming that c = i means assuming not 
only that ordinary epistemic problems regarding the c in question are not occurring, or have 
been solved (mistakes happen, but can be corrected), but also that the more radical, sceptical 
challenge about the truthfulness of c has been met. This bracketing of the sceptical problem is 
fine (Husserl was right about this), as long as our philosophical concerns are of a different 
nature – for example, if we wish to clarify what it means for some semantic information to be 
relevant – but it would be a silly way of begging the question in this context. 
 Finally, there are different strategies to deal with informational scepticism. In what 
follows, I shall argue that either the sceptical challenge is radical, but then it is 
epistemologically innocuous, because informationally redundant; or it is moderate, but then 
epistemologically beneficial, because informationally useful. The conclusion is that, either 
way, there is no epistemologically harmful scepticism.  
 In order to pursue this cooptation strategy, I will need to make much more precise and 
clearer what informational scepticism consists in. This task will require the use of two 
sharper tools, as previously mentioned in the introduction. For we will need to be able to refer 
uniformly to (the data that individuate) different possible worlds (section two), and to adopt a 
metric that enables us to compare, with some precision, the distances between such possible 
worlds, or better, their data (section three). Once so equipped, it will be easy to analyse the 
two forms of scepticism (section four), and then show how the radical one can be tolerated, 
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while the moderate one should be promoted (section five). To repeat, the fundamental thesis 
is simple: scepticism is either a harmless exercise to be enjoyed intellectually, but not to be 
taken at face value epistemologically, or it is actually an essential component of any decent 
epistemic work, in academia as well as in real life. Before the conclusion, I shall consider 
some objections to the general strategy developed in this paper, in order to dispel a few 
potential misunderstandings, for the confused critic, and reinforce the cogency of the 
approach, for the unconvinced reader (section six). Finally, the overall approach to scepticism 
pursued in this paper is clearly much more Peircean than Cartesian (Floridi (1998a)), so it 
will be useful to say just a few words about this methodological aspect in the conclusion 
(section seven). Let us now start by sharpening our tools. 
 
2. Possible Worlds and Borel Numbers 
Suppose we toss a fair coin. The outcome may be described (modelled) by the following 
information i: the coin is heads. Using a common convention, we shall refer to anything like 
the actual coin being tossed and landing heads on a surface after some time as our targeted 
system S, while i will be said to provide a model M of S (MS).  
 Still following a standard approach in information theory, we can disassemble i into a 
combination of a Boolean question Q and a Boolean answer A. The question is a message, 
requesting data, sent by the sender, our epistemic agent a, to the receiver, in our case the 
system represented by S. The answer is also a message, providing the requested data, sent by 
the queried S to the querying a. In short, we have:  
 
  i = Q + A      [1] 
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The polarization of i into Q + A makes evident that the role of A is to saturate Q, to adapt a 
Fregean idea lately borrowed by information theory.
6
 Although it is trivial to apply [1] to any 
piece of information i, like „the coin is heads‟, in order to obtain: 
 
   Question   „Is the coin heads?‟ + 
   Answer                         „yes‟ = 
   Information   „The coin is heads‟ 
 
it is important to keep in mind that the correct interpretation of Q in [1] is not as (i) a request 
for confirmation or (ii) a test, but as (iii) a genuine request by a to S to erase a data deficit on 
a‟s side through saturation. The difference is that, in (i) and (ii), a already holds the 
information that i, but wishes to double-check it, or to check whether the receiver also holds 
that information; whereas in (iii), a lacks the information that i and wishes to acquire it from 
the receiver, by obtaining the missing data. Since we cannot assume that a already holds a 
priori the information that i, the polarization of i requires a channel of communication 
between a and S.  
 Of course, in real life, questions and answers share, in variable proportions, the 
amount of semantic content that is to be found in the corresponding semantic information. 
However, in [1], the full semantic content, to be found in „the coin is heads‟, is entirely 
allocated to Q. Now, one cannot expect a to be able always to maximise the content of a‟s 
questions, for a often lacks much more than just a positive or negative saturation of a 
Boolean question by S. Frequently, a wishes to know, e.g., what the capital of France is, not 
just whether Paris is the capital of France. Still, given some idealization, typical of controlled 
                                                 
6
 In information theory saturation is the condition at which a communications system reaches its maximum 
capacity of traffic-handling. 
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experiments, it is perfectly reasonable, for our present purposes and for the rest of this article, 
to assume that all non-Boolean questions can be translated into Boolean equivalents.
7
 
 As I have argued elsewhere (Floridi (2010)), [1] requires us to specify the context (C) 
in which, the level of abstraction (LoA) at which, and the purpose (P) for which the question 
is formulated, and hence it is expected to be satisfied by the answer. In our case, for example, 
we are in a ideal context (the coin is perfectly fair); we are able to ask only about heads and 
tails (this is the LoA at which data are obtained from S) but not, for instance, about the kind 
of coin tossed, who is tossing it, or the length of time the coin takes to be tossed and to land 
on one side; and the purpose may be assumed to be merely illustrative. For the sake of 
simplicity, I shall refer to the combination of these three parameters by means of the acronym 
CLP. To recall another Fregean point, questions cannot acquire their specific meaning in 
isolation or independently of their CLP parameters. It is a bit of a pain, but we need to keep 
these variables in mind, lest the conceptual mess becomes unmanageable. They will turn out 
to be rather useful in section five. So, as a memory aid, let me revise [1] by adding a 
combined index, thus: 
 
i
CLP
= Q
CLP
 + A
      
[2] 
 
Note that it is now easy to appreciate that it is really Q and not A that sets the scope of the 
CLP parameters. A Boolean answer can only endorse (or reject) the context (C) in which, the 
level of abstraction (LoA) at which, and the purpose (P) for which the Boolean question is 
formulated; it can neither change nor challenge them. 
 Two more advantages offered by [2] are related and they finally lead us to the 
conclusion of this section. In [2], the relation „is correctly saturated by‟ is a function from a 
                                                 
7
 The reader interested in an explicit defence of such translatability will find it in Floridi (2010). 
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countable domain of Boolean questions to a co-domain of only two possible Boolean answers 
{Yes, No} or better {1, 0}. This is an information-theoretic way of interpreting Frege's idea 
that declarative sentences (propositions) are terms that denote one of only two truth-values. 
Unfortunately, having only two values without any possibility of reiteration would be too 
restrictive, because it would make it hard to take into account the complexity of, and the 
possible state-transitions in, the system S. Luckily, [2] allows for a small improvement.  
 Suppose we have two fair coins, which are tossed repeatedly. [2] may still be 
sufficient to capture the more complex system S and its dynamics if we allow strings of 
binary values, as in Table 1. 
  
Context, Level of Abstraction, Purpose 
 
Q1 Q2 
is the first coin heads? is the second coin heads? 
A1 1 0 
A2 0 1 
Table 1 Elementary example of polarised information. 
 
Each numeric row in Table 1, e.g. <1, 0>, provides data on the synchronic state of S, obtained 
through a set of questions, asked relatively to some given CLP parameters. The columns 
provide the data on the transition state of S , i.e. from 1 to 0, in the first column, and from 0 to 
1, in the second. The CLP must be kept invariant for the state transition or indeed any 
comparison (see below) to be, and remain, meaningful. Once again, this will turn out to be 
crucial in section five. The result is that the number of answers is equivalent to the number of 
time-steps in the state transition, whereas the number of questions indicates the complexity of 
the (analysis of the) system. Simplifying, all these data can be contained in one n-tuple: <1, 0 
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| 0, 1>, where occurrences of „,‟ separate synchronic data, and occurrences of „|‟ separate 
diachronic data. We are now ready to appreciate Borel numbers. 
 In 1927, Émile Borel, in a brief article defending mathematical finitism,
8
 presented 
the following “odd problem”, as he called it: 
One could define [a] number by saying that each of [the] successive digits [of its decimal expansion] is 
equal to 0 or 1 according to whether the answer to some question or other is affirmative or negative. 
Moreover, it would be possible to order all the questions that can be asked in the French language by 
sorting them [...] as is done in dictionaries. Only those questions for which the answers is yes or no 
would be retained. The mere knowledge of the number thus defined would give answers to all past, 
present and future enigmas of science, history and curiosity.
9
 
Change French into English or indeed into any other sufficiently expressive language L; sort 
questions not “as is done in dictionaries” but into numbered questions asked relative to some 
given CLP parameters; make the set of questions finite; add a dynamic dimension (Borel‟s 
world is static), and you will recognise our n-tuple, expressed as a binary string.  
 Borel thought that his odd problem was a difficulty not in finite cases, like our 
elementary two-coin system, but whenever one admits real numbers that are inaccessible, or 
even in the case of extremely large numbers that are incomputable. Recently, Chaitin (2006) 
has revived Borel‟s criticism in order to defend a finite and digital ontology.10 For our present 
purposes, however, I hope that any reader who is happy to talk about possible worlds and the 
boundless number of their properties will also allow Borel numbers (henceforth simply ) to 
                                                 
8
 See Marion (1998) for an interesting discussion of Borel‟s position. 
9
 Borel (1927), p. 271, English translation in Mancosu (1998), chapter 21. I use here the slightly revised text 
provided by Tasić (2001), p. 52. 
10
 I owe to Greg Chaitin my first introduction to what he calls Borel “know-it-all number” during the 30th 
International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, in August 2007. Note that both Borel and Chaitin talk only 
about one Borel number, and they do not associate Borel numbers to possible worlds or any modal analysis, let 
alone edit distances. 
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be as long as we may need them to be, and hence possibly infinite, in order to capture such 
properties. Consider that they are no more problematic than real numbers, and they are a very 
efficient and elegant device to describe the data characterising a system S relative to some 
given questions and CLP parameters, in the following way (in what follows, the reader 
acquainted with Carnap-like state-descriptions might wish to compare them to Borel 
numbers; the comparison is explicitly discussed in section seven, objection four).  
 If one simplifies the analysis and disregards any dynamic aspect (for we now know 
that such a feature could easily be added anyway), one can see that the data produced by 
static possible worlds are Borel numbers. Alternatively, Borel numbers are snapshots of 
possible worlds. Thus, our one-coin, static system has a very simple , which is either 1 or 0. 
The four states of the two-coin, dynamic system are described by four and so forth. 
Transitions systems are described by well-ordered sets of Borel numbers, where the ordering 
relation ≤ is suitably interpreted in chronological terms, e.g. „is not a state subsequent to‟. If 
this is unclear, here is another elementary illustration.  
 Imagine that our system S is a micro-world consisting of two cards. Our LoA consists 
of the following observables: a card can be either a King or not a King, and it can be either 
Spades or Clubs. S can be observed to be in sixteen possible states. Suppose the actual state 
of S from an imaginary God‟s eye perspective is the following: 
  
Figure 1 Example of a state of a system S consisting of two cards. 
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Depending on the CLP parameters, there are many ways of expressing the information that 
the first card is a King of Clubs and the second card is Spades but not a King, and this further 
clarifies the crucial importance of the CLP parameters. We could transform the information 
[the first card is a King of Clubs and the second card Spades but not a King] into the 
question: is the first card a King of Clubs and the second card not a King but Spades? The 
Borel number would simply be 1. This alternative is always available in principle, since, no 
matter how complex (in the sense introduced above) the system is, one can always generate 
such a conjunction of all the relevant questions as to require only a single yes/no answer. In 
light of what has been said above, we may agree to call one-digit Borel numbers Fregean 
numbers. Fregean numbers
11
 are usually uninteresting. Our information about the world is 
obtained and managed at a much more finely grained level. Of course, we could ask two 
questions instead of only one („is the first card such and such?‟ and then „is the second so and 
so?‟), but let us assume, just for the sake of illustration, that we work at what seems to be a 
more intuitive and information-theoretically fruitful level of abstraction, one at which we ask 
four questions: Q1: is the first card a King? Q2: is the first card Clubs? Q3: is the second card 
King? Q4: is the second card Spades? This way, we obtain  = 1101. Now, 1101 is the 
shortest Borel number that characterises the possible world S at a given time and given the 
specified questions and CLP parameters. It is also the Borel number that needs to be obtained 
by a in order to be informed about S relatively to the given questions and CLP parameters. 
Figure 2 provides a graphic illustration.  
                                                 
11
 According to The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy there is a third Fregean number, 42.  
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Figure 2 System and Model share the same Borel number. 
 
We now have a simple way to describe possible worlds as their shortest Borel numbers, 
according to a given set of questions and CLP parameters, no matter how complex a possible 
world is and hence how long its  needs to be. To put it in terms of Kolmogorov or 
algorithmic complexity: Borel numbers are the minimal computational resources needed by 
an informational agent such as a to specify a possible world. Each possible world is 
characterised by its Borel number. There are as many Borel numbers as (states of) possible 
worlds, and as many Borel numbers as possible sets of CFP parameters relative to which sets 
of questions are asked. Transitions are captured by well-ordered sets of Borel numbers, which 
can be compressed, if one disregards all the numbers that remain unchanged when moving 
from m to n (think of this as data refreshing cycles on ).  
 Of course, in order to be able to compare Borel numbers of possible worlds, both the 
questions asked and the relative CLP parameters must remain invariant across the comparison 
so, from now on, we shall simply assume that they are specified. I shall return to this 
important simplification below. For the moment, let us just say that Borel numbers are the 
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variables that make the difference. In order to analyse and compare such difference we need a 
metric. 
 
3. The Edit Distance as a Modal Metrics 
Since Lewis‟ work on counterfactuals (Lewis (1973)), it has become common to talk about 
degrees of closeness between possible worlds. Nowadays, the widespread impression seems 
to be that we know exactly what we are talking about. The truth is that often we do not.  
 The false impression may be due to the fact that we rely on simplistic assumptions 
and implausible scenarios in order to illustrate the notion of closeness. This is misleading. It 
goes without saying that a possible world in which my wife is late because of some traffic is 
closer to the possible world in which she is on time than a possible world in which she is late 
because she has been momentarily kidnapped by some extra-terrestrials and then released. 
But it is hardly intelligible to ask whether a possible world in which Japan never bombed 
Pearl Harbour is more or less close to the one in which you are reading these words, when 
compared to another possible world in which Hitler honoured the Treaty of Non-Aggression 
between Germany and the Soviet Union. It has to be said that Lewis himself was aware of the 
difficulty, and virtuously bit the bullet:  
 
Overall similarity among worlds is some sort of resultant of similarities and differences of many 
different kinds, and I have not said what system of weights or priorities should be used to squeeze these 
down into a single relation of overall similarity. I count that a virtue. Counterfactuals are both vague 
and various. Different resolutions of the vagueness of overall similarity are appropriate in different 
contexts. Lewis (1979), 465. 
  
In truth, Lewis‟ comment reminds one of the notorious disclaimer in IT, according to which a 
problem „it‟s not a bug, it‟s a feature‟. The vagueness of the concept of modal closeness is 
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due to the fact that it was introduced to deal with the semantics of counterfactuals and 
“counterfactuals are infected with vagueness, as everyone agrees” (Lewis (1979), 457). We 
basically use common sense (e.g. Lewis‟ suggestions concerning the absence of large 
miracles) and some elementary logic relations (e.g. asymmetry and Lewis‟ back-tracking) in 
order to extricate ourselves from the mess they introduce. So I agree that  
 
we must use what we know about counterfactuals to find out about the appropriate similarity relation – 
not the other way around. Lewis (1979), 467. 
 
However, that is exactly why, in the end, it becomes a matter of more or less compatible 
intuitions, an issue that Lewis‟ analysis was meant to help to resolve in the first place. So far, 
the conceptual difficulty. There is a second difficulty that is more formal in nature.
12
  
 Contrary to expectations, the formal relations of closeness (Lewis (1973), 29), 
nearness or approximation – as well as that of similarity often used to make sense of them13 – 
do not provide a metric d on a set of elements, including sets of possible worlds. This because 
they fail to satisfy the second of the four axioms for a metric: 
1. d (x, y) ≥ 0    non-negativity 
2. d (x, y) = 0  x = y  identity of indiscernibles 
3. d (x, y) = d (y, x)   symmetry 
4. d (x, z) ≤ d (x, y) + d (y, z)  subadditivity or triangle inequality 
If the closeness, nearness, approximation or similarity between two possible worlds is null, 
then they patently cannot be the same possible world.  
                                                 
12
 But not only formal, see Kutach (2006). 
13
 “The right general analysis of counterfactuals, in my opinion, is one based on comparative similarity of 
possible worlds”, Lewis (1979), 464. 
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 There are at least two strategies to deal with the difficulties highlighted above, short 
of abandoning the whole project. One is to maintain the choice of the semantic relation and 
decide on, for example, a proximity space, which axiomatises relations of „nearness‟ 
(Naimpally and Warrack (1970)). A proximity space (X, δ) is a set X with a binary relation δ 
(which can be read as „is close to‟) of proximity (proximity structure) on the power set P(X) 
of all its subsets, satisfying the following conditions (for all subsets A, B, C):
14
 
1. A δ A  A ≠ 0   reflexivity  
2. A δ B  B δ A   symmetry 
3. A δ (B  C)  A δ B or A δ C binary additivity 
It is easy to see that the three axioms are satisfied by Lewis‟ modal closeness, which is also a 
tolerance relation.
15
 Since δ holds between sets, these could be Borel numbers.  
 The alternative strategy, which I shall adopt here, is to modify the semantic notion, 
used to compare possible worlds, in such a way as to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles 
axiom. Here is the rationale. The properties of proximity spaces are a generalization of the 
properties of a metric space. The proximity spaces which satisfy the metric axioms are known 
as metrizable, and this is the kind of metric space that we need here in order to calculate the 
distance between possible worlds. For the goal is to introduce the „edit distance‟ between 
Borel numbers as the possibility of correcting substrings in one Borel number when this is 
compared to another. So, a very simple option is to choose the dual notion of close, i.e., 
distant, and hence of similarity, i.e., dissimilarity. Dissimilarity relations (including, for 
                                                 
14
 There are many equivalent sets of axioms for a proximity space, see for example the one provided here tends 
to be more common and is only slightly modified from Deza and Deza (2009), 70, in order to match more 
closely the previous list of metric axioms. 
15
 A tolerance relation is a reflexive and symmetric relation without transitivity property, i.e. a weaker form of 
the equivalence relation. 
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example, information divergence) are still retro-compatible with Lewis‟ analysis of 
counterfactuals, since every metric space is a proximity space. But they also satisfy all four 
axioms for a metric space, giving us a more refined and flexible analysis of distance. 
Dissimilarity works at a finer LoA (points not just sets) and, above all, as I anticipated, since 
it is a metric, it makes possible to use the edit distance to compare Borel numbers. The idea is 
not entirely new. In order to introduce it, let us return to our example. 
 Let us assume that the system S is still in the same state as illustrated above, but that 
a‟s information i, expressed in some language L, is equivalent to: 
 
  
Figure 3 Example of a’s misinformation about the state of system S consisting of two cards (see Figure 1). 
 
There is now a mismatch between S= 1101 and M 1111. In order to correct a‟s 
misinformation, M needs to be edited. In this elementary illustration, the editing distance 
consists in only one step, a replacement of the third digit (see Figure 4). This is known as the 
Hamming distance (hd), which measures the minimum number of substitutions required to 
change one string into another.  
 The Hamming distance is a standard tool in any context where two strings of data of 
equal length need to be compared for similarities (dissimilarities, in our revised approach) 
and correctible errors, including biological sequences, automatic spell-checkers, or pattern 
recognition systems. Unsurprisingly, it is a popular metric in the literature on belief- and 
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knowledge-base revision (Papini (2000)), or agent-based systems (Gabbay and Schlechta 
(2009)). In modal logic, it is one of the staple options to calculate the distance between 
possible worlds:  
 
The spheres around the worlds are assumed by Lewis to be given. Epistemologically, one would like to 
be able to say how to ﬁnd this structure, that is, to construe it from properties of the worlds themselves. 
A primitive solution is that the spheres around w are the worlds [our Borel numbers] of Hamming-
distance ≤ n for every given n. (This means that at most n values of the primitive letters can be changed 
in going from w to a world in that sphere.) We could also say that the worlds in the spheres result in the 
revision of the theory at w. Kracht and Kutz (2007), 958-959. 
 
The Hamming distance between two binary strings, such as two Borel numbers n and m, has 
the nice property of being equal to the sum of 1s in their exclusive disjunction, so it can be 
expressed as hd (n, m) = n  m.  
 The Hamming distance is not the only edit distance. There are others, depending, for 
example, on what sort and combination of edit operations, such as substitution, insertion, 
deletion or transposition, are allowed. In particular, it is well-known that the Hamming 
distance is criticisable for being too rigid (Lafage and Lang (2001)) and, since it is 
syntactically inflexible and defined only for inputs of the same length, in some cases it might 
not be the best option. If S grows or shrinks (suppose we add or remove a card in our 
example), or a has asked too few or too many questions, it would be useful to be able to rely 
on the other two operations of deletion and insertion in order to correct M. This give us the 
Levenshtein distance, which can be further improved through the Needleman-Wunch 
distance by adding a „gap cost‟, when there are more or less „expensive‟ ways of correcting a 
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string. These and other
16
 alternatives are available to any reader interested in refining the 
approach. But since all such distances share the same axioms, in this paper their choice will 
not make a difference and, for the sake of simplicity, I suggest we adopt the simpler, 
Hamming distance. It is now time to analyse the sceptical challenge. 
 
Figure 4 An example of Hamming distance between two Borel numbers. 
 
4. Informational Scepticism or the Sceptical Challenge Reconstructed 
According to the anti-sceptic philosopher, an informational agent a embedded in a possible 
world enjoys a boundless number of informative, zero-Hamming-distance relations with it. 
This means that a‟s empirical data about a‟s world are, normally, indiscernible from the data 
a receives from it, and when they are discernible they are either corrigible, at least in 
principle, or at least they are transparently incorrigible, again, in principle. More formally, 
given M, either M  S = 0 or, if M  S ≠ 0 then, either M  S can, in principle, be 
reduced to zero by further editing, or at least a has in principle access to the meta-information 
                                                 
16
 See for example the Dalal distance, popular in model-based belief-revision analyses, which compares sets of 
models according to their minimal Hamming distance to other sets of models (Dalal (1988), Satoh (1988)). 
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that M  S ≠ 0 (a can be informed that hd should be edited but also that it is not 
improvable). Either way, scepticism may be dismissed as unjustified.  
 The sceptic, of course, begs to differ. He does not argue that, given a‟s M, the 
distance between a‟s model and its targeted system is greater than zero, but that the length of 
such distance cannot be established. More formally, he argues that hd1 = M  S = ?, not that 
hd1 = M  S > 0. Such challenge is motivated by the fact that a might be radically 
misinformed. Circumstances could be such as to give a the impression that hd1 = M  S = 0, 
when actually hd1 = M  S ≠ 0. Such circumstances are well known: a might be dreaming, 
or be a brain in a vat, or an avatar in Second Life who believes to be a human being in First 
Life, or a biological body in a Matrix scenario, or a citizen constantly and secretly misled by 
some Big Brother. The examples can easily be multiplied but, at least since Descartes, they 
all share the following format (see Figure 5). Perhaps (a does not have this bit of 
information), a is not informed about the real world (the system S), despite all appearances 
that hd1 = 0, because the following is a logical possibility: a‟s model M, which allegedly 
carries information about S, is actually indistinguishable
17
 (hd2 = 0) from another model (call 
it D from dreamt), which carries information (hd3 = 0) about a possible world (call it V for 
virtual), and V and S might (a does not have this bit of information either) be very different 
from each other, in which case a might be utterly misinformed. More formally, informational 
scepticism argues that, since hd2 = 0 and hd3 = 0 might be the cases, then hd4 = ? and 
therefore hd1 = ?  
 
                                                 
17
 “Quasi scilicet non recorder a similibus etiam cogitationibus me alias in somnis fuisse delusum; quae dum 
cogito attentius, tam plane video nunquam certis indiciis vigiliam a somno posse distingui [my italics] ut 
obstupescam, et fere hic ipse stupor mihi opinionem somni confirmet”, Descartes, First Mediation, 1641. 
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Figure 5 Example of Informational Scepticism 
  
5. The Redundancy of Radical Informational Scepticism 
Two quick clarifications are now in order, before showing why informational scepticism is 
harmless. First, the sceptic must (and is also happy to) concede that, because of the triangle 
inequality then hd5 ≤ hd2 + hd3, but since hd2 + hd3 = 0, then hd5 = 0 (see Figure 6). This is 
exactly as it ought to be because the disruptive hypothesis, which the sceptic is inviting us to 
entertain, is that a‟s information and its corresponding hd = 0 might not concern S but V.  
 Second, the challenge posed by informational scepticism has been formulated in terms 
of (hd4 = V  S = ?) → (hd1 = M  S = ?), but it could be formulated equally well in terms 
of: (hd6 = D  S = ?) → (hd1 = M  S = ?).  
 At this point we know that: 
1. hd2 = 0  sceptical hypothesis 
2. hd3 = 0  sceptical hypothesis 
3. hd5 = 0  from 1, 2 and the triangle inequality axiom  
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4. hd1 = hd4 from 3 and the triangle inequality axiom 
It follows that, in order to meet the sceptical challenge, it is sufficient to show that we can 
establish one of the following distances: hd1, hd4, or hd6.  
 One approach, the direct analysis of hd6, is precluded by informational scepticism 
itself. The hypothesis – to be taken seriously by the anti-sceptic who wishes to engage with 
the sceptic – is that there is no way of inspecting whether D is informative about S. The 
dreaming argument, for instance, presupposes that you cannot just wake up and realise you 
were dreaming, because you may then be dreaming that you are no longer dreaming, and so 
forth. Pascal summarises the point nicely: 
The main strengths of the Pyrrhonists – I shall leave aside the lesser ones – are that we can be in no 
way sure of the truths of these principles apart from faith and revelation, except that we feel them to be 
natural to us. Now this natural feeling is not a convincing proof of their truth, since, having no 
certainty, apart from faith, about whether we were created by a benevolent God, or an evil demon, or 
by chance, it is open to doubt whether the principles given to us are true, or false, or uncertain, 
depending on our origin. In addition, since none of us can be certain, apart from faith, whether we are 
awake or asleep, given that while asleep we believe as firmly as we do that we are awake. We think we 
see space, figures, movement. We feel the passage of time, we measure it; in short we behave just as 
we do when awake. The result is that, spending half our lives asleep, by our own admission and 
whatever it seems like to us, we have not the slightest conception of the truth, as all our feelings during 
that period are illusions. Who knows if that other half of our lives when we assume we are awake is not 
another form of sleep, slightly different from the first kind, which we awaken when we think we are 
sleeping? As we do often dream that we are dreaming, piling one dream on top of another, is it not 
perfectly feasible that the half of our life when we think we are awake is just itself a dream on to which 
the others are grafted and from which we will awaken at our death? Pascal (1995), n. 164. 
 
In the sceptical Matrix, to use a different example, there is no red pill. So the disagreement 
boils down to diverging views about hd1 and hd4. Again, this is consistent with the classic 
debate about scepticism. The anti-sceptic holds that there are many cases of genuine 
information, i.e., hd1 = 0, and therefore that, in such cases, hd4 = 0, and hence that hd6 = 0. 
The sceptic holds that nobody can tell whether hd4 = 0, and therefore that nobody can tell 
whether hd1 = 0 and hence whether hd6 = 0. The anti-sceptic defends a position in the 
philosophy of information which the sceptic attacks metaphysically. 
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Figure 6 Some Implications of Informational Scepticism 
 
Luckily, the situation is much better than it looks. As we know, hd1  0. Trivially, if hd1 = 0 
then there is no sceptical challenge, so let us assume that hd1  0. In this case, we have two 
alternatives: 
i) M cannot be edited in order to decrease hd1, so a stops immediately; or 
ii) M can be edited, in which case a keeps editing it until hd1 cannot be further 
decreased. 
Following the sceptical challenge, the possibility of editing M must be understood, in both 
(i) and (ii), to be „in principle‟: when a stops, this is because, no matter how much more 
editing a might still be able to do, this would not improve the distance between M and S. At 
this point, a cannot assume to have any direct information about the exact hd1 between M 
and S. However, a does have the meta-information that there is not a single bit of 
information, concerning S, that could make an informative difference to the editing of M, 
for if there were, a would carry on the editing and stop only after the required steps (recall 
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that the sceptical challenge does not allow any „red pill‟ or „weak-up‟ solution). This is 
crucial. For consider now the following two ways of describing informational equivalence or 
co-informativeness:  
i) p and q are co-informative if and only if all the information in p is also inferable 
from q and vice versa (Larkin and Simon (1987)), i.e., if and only if they both exclude 
exactly the same possible worlds. 
M and S are co-informative in (i) sense, since all the information obtainable from one is also 
obtainable from the other and vice versa.
18
 If they were not, a would edit M until they 
become co-informative. But (i) is equivalent to (ii): 
ii) p and q are co-informative if and only if p can be transformed into q without any 
loss of information and vice versa. (Simon (1978)) 
And since M and S are co-informative, then they can be transformed into each other without 
any further editing. The result is that M and S are identical, in the following, qualified sense. 
 Following Leibniz‟s principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, it is obvious that, if 
p and q qualify as information, and p = q, then p and q are co-informative. The identity in 
question, in such a co-informativeness of identicals, is the very strong identity one obtains 
only when there is no single property that distinguishes p from q, no matter what the context, 
LoA and purpose (CLP) might be. In other words, p = q is the case if and only if one can 
safely ignore the CLP parameters at which the identity is predicated. Consider now Leibniz‟s 
more controversial principle of the identity of indiscernibles. At first sight, this would 
translate into the identity of co-informatives, which is obviously false. It takes only a moment 
to realise that p and q may be perfectly co-informative without being the same (Larkin and 
                                                 
18
 For a similar approach see Williamson (1987), who, generalising a suggestion by Geach, proves that, in the 
more restricted case of two relations, these are informationally  equivalent if  and only if  each can be defined  in 
terms of  the other without the use of  quantifiers. 
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Simon (1987)). Just imagine two fire alarms, one acoustic and the other visual, conveying 
exactly the same information. What is wrong with the identity of co-informatives is that it 
tries to adopt the same approach to CLP parameters that one finds at work in the principle of 
the indiscernibility of identicals. In other words, one makes the mistake of thinking that, in 
this case as well, it does not matter which context, LoA or purpose are in question. However, 
in the simple counterexample above, we can distinguish between the two co-informatives 
precisely because we take into account not only the identical information they convey, but 
also their physical features, namely a piercing noise and a flashing light. So the correct way 
of stating the second principle is by constraining it within the given CLP parameters 
according to which the relata are considered to be co-informative in the first place: if p and q 
are co-informative, they are so at a given LoA, in a specific context and for a particular 
purpose, so they are also identical, but at that given LoA, in that specific context and for that 
particular purpose. Wittgenstein‟s famous two issues of the same newspaper are co-
informative, and therefore identical, exactly in this qualified sense. Since this is what we 
mean by saying that p and q are informationally equivalent, let me refer to this revised 
Leibnizian principle as to the constrained identity of co-informatives. 
 Let us now return to the conclusion of the previous reasoning. Since M and S are co-
informative according to the CLP parameters specified, then they are identical, still according 
to those CLP parameters. But we said at the beginning of our investigation that we were 
going to ignore the CLP parameters only for the sake of simplicity. They have been there all 
along. All Borel numbers are always parameterised, and they must all be equally 
parameterised for their comparison to make any sense. So all the distances identified so far 
are valid at some given CLP parameters, just as the constrained identity of co-informatives is. 
It follows that M = S according to the same CLP parameters implicitly employed when 
discussing all the other distances. So, contrary to our initial assumption, hd1 cannot be greater 
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than 0, but given that hd1 = hd4, it follows that hd4 = 0 and that hd6 = 0 because of the triangle 
inequality axiom. Summarising, we have: 
1. hd2 = 0  sceptical hypothesis 
2. hd3 = 0  sceptical hypothesis 
3. hd5 = 0  from 1,2  
4. hd1 = hd4 from 3 and the triangle inequality axiom 
5. hd1 = 0  from the constrained identity of co-informatives 
6. hd4 = 0  from 4 and 5 
7. hd6 = 0  from 2, 6 and the triangle inequality axiom 
All distances are actually zero (see Figure 7). Once made fully explicit and clarified in detail, 
radical informational scepticism, with its fanciful scenarios of possible worlds, can be proved 
to be entirely redundant informationally, so it can be disregarded as harmless. Wondering 
whether we might be dreaming, or living in a Matrix, or might be butterflies who think they 
are humans, or might be characters in a sci-fi simulation created by some future civilization, 
and so forth, are pointless speculations that may be amusing, but make no significant 
difference to the serious problem of how we acquire, manage, and refine our information 
about the world. 
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Figure 7 An Example of the Redundancy of the Sceptical Challenge. 
 
6. The Usefulness of Moderate Informational Scepticism 
Absolute, radical or total forms of informational scepticism are cases of friendly fire: they 
seem to be attempts to investigate and test our information about the world without prejudice, 
but they end up promoting disastrous politics of epistemic laissez-faire, which scientologists 
and creationists, astrologists and fundamentalists as well as gurus of all kinds are way too 
happy to exploit. If anything goes, if there are no firewalls against idiocy and irrationality, if 
we create an informational vacuum, then any bogus belief has an equal right to be sold in the 
market of ideas. This conclusion should not be read as a dismissal of the useful role that 
moderate forms of informational scepticism can and must play in our intellectual lives. On 
the contrary, given the nature of our information-based society, there is an increasing need for 
a sceptical attitude towards the overabundant mass of contents (in the technical sense 
introduced above) to which we are exposed. Mis- and dis-information
19
 are rampant, as well 
                                                 
19
 Disinformation is understood here as the intentional dissemination of misinformation. 
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as dogmatism and intolerance, so we need more rather than less scepticism, but it must be of 
the right kind. As Cajal insightfully remarks in his beautiful Advice for a Young Investigator, 
“The investigator‟s motto will always be Cicero‟s phrase: Dubitando ad veritatem 
pervenimus”.20 So where is the constructive role for sceptical doubts in the previous analysis?  
 Recall how we saw that a is supposed to edit the relevant Borel number until the 
distance between M and S cannot be further decreased. In less technical terms, a “is 
distinguished by a rigid worship of truth, and by a sound and genuine skepticism” (Ramón y 
Cajal (1999), 145), which allows a to question and test a‟s information thoroughly, without 
prejudice but with an open mind, in order to refine it as much as this is feasible. Good 
scepticism offers a robust benchmark for testing our information under extreme, but still 
plausible, conditions. You would not dismiss a car because you cannot drive it on the Moon. 
This role differs from that of radical informational scepticism insofar as it is not metaphysical 
– it does not deal with logically possible worlds in which we might be deluded into thinking 
that we are informed about the real world – but epistemological or methodological, since it 
deals with actual errors, usual mistakes, potential biases, and the inevitably fallible and often 
probabilistic nature of our informative transactions with the world, thus exercising an open 
and tolerant attitude towards other views. As Abelard writes: “By doubt indeed we come to 
questioning; by questioning, we perceive the truth”.21 Sceptical doubts of an epistemological 
kind are essential for the acquisition, refinement and updating of information. They play a 
very useful role in the evolution of our understanding of the world.  
 
  
                                                 
20
 “By way of doubting we arrive at the truth” (Ramón y Cajal (1999), p. 55). The common attribution to Cicero 
is actually based on a paraphrase of a passage in his Tusculanae Disputationes 1.30.73. 
21
 Abelard (1976), Prologue: “Dubitando quippe ad inquisitionem venimus; inquirendo veritatem percipimus”. 
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7. Objections and Replies 
By way of further clarification, let me now address a few potential objections that might help 
to dissipate some doubts and criticisms. 
 
1) Objection: infinite Borel numbers may be incommensurable. It might be objected that, if 
Borel numbers can be infinite, as they might have to be if they are to encode the binary 
strings that answer all questions about the state of a possible worlds, then it is unclear how 
one might be able to compare them at all.  
 
Reply: the difficulty is real, but irrelevant. The sceptic asks us to consider a whole possible 
world in which we are, for example, sleeping. So the possibility of an infinite is something 
we are conceding to the sceptic, not introducing ourselves in the first place. If a strict finitist 
reader remains dissatisfied, we could agree to work on meaningful substrings of Borel 
numbers, those that, for instance, represent the Boolean answers to Descartes‟ questions 
about “the opening of the eyes, the motion of the head, the forth-putting of the hands [... the 
possession of] an entire body [or] hands” (First Meditation). 
 
2) Objection: distances between Borel Numbers can be very counterintuitive. Suppose we 
have three possible worlds W1, W2 and W3, such that W1 is the empirical world in which your 
wife is late because of some traffic, W2 is a possible world in which your wife is late because 
her car had a flat tyre that had to be replaced, and W3 is a possible world in which your wife 
is late because she was momentarily abducted by some extra-terrestrials. Both the Hamming 
distance between W1 and W2 and the Hamming distance between W1 and W3 are 1, since, in 
both cases, we are assuming that it is only one question that receives a different answer, but 
surely this must be a reductio ad absurdum, because intuitively W1 and W2 are much less 
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distant (much closer, in Lewis‟ sense) than W1 and W3, at least because we have decided to 
conceive them to be so. It follows that the analysis is flawed: either Borel numbers do not 
provide a satisfactory description of possible worlds, or the Hamming edit distance between 
them provides the wrong metric, or indeed both, and the same holds true for other metric 
distances as well. In any case, the issuing analysis of radical informational scepticism must be 
deficient. 
 
Reply: the objection raises a very serious problem, but this is actually different from the one 
that it seems to present. What is indeed untenable is the idea that possible worlds might be 
comparable „ceteris paribus‟ without being extremely careful regarding the scope of such 
clause and what it really implies. Let me explain by using the same example. The mistake lies 
in pretending to be able to conceive three possible worlds such as W1, W2 and W3, that, all 
other things being equal, differ only for one single feature, the cause of your wife‟s delay. 
This is absurd. A world in which your wife is late because she is spending some time on an 
extra-terrestrial spaceship is very distant from W1 exactly because that event requires the 
coherent modification of an enormous number of other answers to other questions about the 
existence of aliens, of their visit to earth, of life in the universe, and so forth. Once again, and 
at the risk of becoming tedious, it is a question of context, levels of abstraction and purpose. 
Anything can be „similar‟ to anything else, given some CLP parameters, but that is why we 
should be careful about the choice of the latter. If all we can observe, when analysing three 
systems such as W1, W2 and W3, is determined by only one question about the cause of your 
wife‟s delay, then it is correct to say that the distance between W1 and W2 and W1 and W3 
must be 1. If this is felt to be unsatisfactory, the problem does not lie with Borel numbers and 
their Hamming distances and the issuing analysis, but with the selection of the right CLP 
parameters. Make them more inclusive and you will soon see that W1 and W2 are much closer 
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than W1 and W3, since, if we choose the right questions, progressively less will need to be 
edited in W2 than in W3. Borel numbers and metric distances are good conceptual tools, but 
there is no blind and mechanical computemus à la Leibinz: their adequate and productive use 
requires intelligence and insightfulness in the handling of the CLP framework.
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3) Objection: edit distances might be computationally intractable. Even regular languages 
(the set of words accepted by a given finite automaton) are computationally complex, when it 
comes to calculating their Hamming (Manthey and Reischuk (2005)) or Levenshtein 
distances (Konstantinidis (2007)). The relevant and interesting result for the analysis 
proposed in this paper was already obtained by Ernvall et al. (1985), who proved that the 
Travelling Salesman Problem, when cities are digital strings (our Borel numbers) with 
Hamming distances, is NP-complete. Of course, strings may be finite, short and easily 
computable, but given the intractability of the worst scenarios, and the fact that complete 
descriptions of whole possible worlds do represent such worst scenarios, what are we gaining 
from the introduction of Borel numbers and Hamming distances? Aren‟t these just pointless 
technicalities, which, in all sufficiently interesting cases, merely complicate rather than 
facilitate the problem of describing and comparing possible worlds in terms of their 
distances? It seems that either the descriptions and the comparisons are trivial, in which case 
the formal tools are unnecessary, or they are complex, in which case the same tools are 
useless.  
  
Reply: this is a fair objection, but it must be properly addressed, for it does not affect the line 
of reasoning developed in this paper, but rather the Lewisian approach, in the following 
sense. In the analysis provided in this article, I deal with potentially infinite descriptions 
                                                 
22
 The Art of Discovery (1685), now Leibniz (1951), 51. 
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(Borel numbers) only when their Hamming distances are assumed to be zero ex hypothesis 
(informational scepticism), or different from, but reducible to zero, by further investigation 
(informational anti-scepticism). I have not attempted to show how to calculate the distance 
between infinite  (two full descriptions of two possible worlds) when their hd might be 
equally infinite. For I agree that, when we have sufficiently complex (in the sense introduced 
above) Borel numbers, such comparisons are computationally unrealistic. Yet this does not 
take anything away from the project of making more rigorous the possibility of having a 
modal metrics. We are indeed better off by understanding what exactly is required through 
any serious attempt to develop it. This is partly because we can then come to realise how 
inane it is to speak of whole possible worlds comparisons in general, and partly because we 
can rely on such formal analysis to deal with degenerate cases in which infinite strings have 
hd = 0. So, the objection is correct but it does not affect the argument developed in this paper, 
which deals with a special case, and it underestimates the importance of providing a negative 
result. The objection should rather be addressed to anyone who seeks to compare infinite 
descriptions potentially different at an infinite number of data points.
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4) Objection: the analysis lacks originality. We do not really need Borel numbers and 
Hamming distances. Possible worlds may be described by assigning truth-values to maximal 
sets of atomic propositions, in some sufficiently expressive language L, which completely 
describe a possible world, so that modal distances can be calculated in terms of the number of 
atomic propositions that differ in their assigned truth values. Indeed, Borel numbers might be 
compared to (possibly infinite) Carnapian state-descriptions:  
 
                                                 
23
 Holm (2003) provides the generalization needed to deal with possibly infinite descriptions in state description 
semantics. I am grateful to Giuseppe Primiero for calling my attention to this point.  
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A state-description is defined as a conjunction or class of basic sentences (i.e., atomic sentences and 
negations of such) which for every atomic sentence S contains either S or non-S but not both and no 
other sentences. A state-description is intended to represent a possible state of affairs of the universe of 
discourse. Carnap (1951), 75.  
 
Since Carnap, the idea of replacing possible worlds by their descriptions in some language L 
(such as constituents or model sets) has been rather popular (see for example Hintikka 
(1973); Niiniluoto (1987), p. 481 note 3 explicitly addresses this point). Borel numbers are 
just another variation of the same approach. 
  
Reply: this is more a clarification than an objection. If the comparison between Carnap-like 
state-descriptions and Borel numbers helps one to understand the latter, it is very welcome. I 
also agree that, for finite and simple systems, the difference might not be significant. 
However, despite the similarity of the two approaches, there are some features that make 
Borel numbers preferable. First, the Q&A framework avoids the construction of the informed 
agent a as a passive recipient of messages (whole propositions) sent by S. Rather, the 
language in which Galileo‟s book of nature is written in that of data (Borel numbers), not of 
sentences, and it is up to a to extract the data by questioning nature in a Baconian way. 
Second, note that state-descriptions à la Carnap are bottom-up propositional constructs from 
a formal language, whereas Borel numbers are top-down data, extracted from contents that 
we consider information, so the latter do not encounter the same limitations that undermine 
the former (see the debate between Bar-Hillel (1951) and Carnap (1951)): Carnap-like state-
descriptions seem to facilitate and invite an ontological commitment that Borel numbers 
make much more difficult, if not impossible. Third, Borel numbers are more economical: we 
use bits of information and polarise them into questions and answers, whereas Carnapian 
state-descriptions require propositions (our Q + A) and corresponding truth values as extra 
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keys to determine their fitness to a particular target, so that the ontological status and location 
of such values becomes a further issue that requires more theorising, somewhat like Frege‟s 
position about the Truth and the False. Fourth, Borel numbers, being the result of an 
informational analysis, are better suited than Carnapian state-descriptions to provide a full 
and detailed analysis of the CLP parameters at which they are obtained. A final reason worth 
listing here is connected with the sort of correctness theory of truth that Borel number and the 
Q&A framework can elicit, but I shall say more about this in the reply to the next objection 
and in the conclusion. 
 
5) Objection: there is a confusion between truth-values and probability distributions. Borel 
numbers and their Hamming distances are introduced from an informational-theoretic 
perspective. However, a Borel number and its corresponding question form a propositional 
artefact in which 1s or 0s are equivalent to truth values and have nothing to do with the 
probability that the content in the question might be true or false, respectively; yet, this is 
exactly what is relevant in information theory, where we deal with probability distributions 
instead. In the one-coin system example, the 1 bit of information provided by heads (or tails) 
corresponds to the 50% probability that the coin might land heads (or tails), not to the binary 
value of the truth (or falsehood) of the assertion that it landed heads (or tails). Thus, if the 
coin were biased, the information provided by its tossing would be less than 1, but 1 (or 0) 
would still be the correct answer to the relevant question. All this means that there is at the 
root of the analysis a confusion between truth-values and probability distributions that 
undermines the whole analysis.  
  
Reply: there is no confusion and hence no problem. One could construct the whole analysis 
by treating Borel numbers as probability values (Yue et al. (2008)), use, for example, the so-
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called „earth mover's distance‟ or Wasserstein metric as the distance function defined 
between probability distributions on a given metric space, and then treat the co-
informativeness of M and S in terms of zero Kullback–Leibler divergence, i.e., DKL = 0, 
since DKL(M || S) = 0  M = S. Yet the exercise would be rather pointless, since this is 
not the issue at stake. We are treating Borel numbers as unlocking keys of specific contents, 
exactly as discussed in the previous objection and the consequent reply. So although the 
warning of a potential confusion is welcome, the actual error is nowhere committed. 
 
6) Objection: the approach is too friendly in its rejection of radical informational scepticism. 
Let us assume that the analysis and the arguments presented in this paper are accepted. The 
problem remains that too much has been conceded to the radical sceptic. For if all hd = 0, as 
argued, then there is really no way of showing whether a lives in a virtual or the real world. 
The distances might all be equal to zero because there is no real world, only a virtual one in 
which we all live. 
 
Reply: the objection is trivially correct, insofar as it is a matter of elementary logic that, if the 
Hamming distance between two relata is zero, then one may as well say that the first relatum 
is identical to the second. The objection, however, is more interestingly mistaken when it 
infers from such a platitude that the radical sceptic might be satisfied by it. What the 
objection is missing is that there is no room left to argue that the virtual world, in which we 
might live, is not the real world. Yes, it might be true that “All the world's a stage, And all the 
men and women merely players”,24 but this does not make any informational difference, as 
long as we accept that there is only this stage anyway. There is nothing to be epistemically 
                                                 
24
 William Shakespeare, As You Like It, II.7. 
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worried about calling the real virtual, or the virtual real, if the two are identical. It is only a 
matter of poetic taste.  
 
7) Objection: the approach is inconclusive in its defence of moderate informational 
scepticism. Once again, let us assume that the analysis and the arguments presented in this 
paper are accepted. There is a difficulty about which we are offered no clue, namely when 
and how the moderate form of informational scepticism should stop. In theory, the sceptic 
might argue that his testing and probing could go on interminably, leaving forever 
undetermined whether we have reach a point when M and S are really co-informative or 
merely appear to be so. But if this regressus ad infinitum is the case, then the whole strategy 
is inconclusive and the sceptic has the last word. 
 
Reply: the objection is correct in stressing that forms of moderate informational scepticism 
need to be handled with care. They are powerful acids that can not only clean and polish our 
information about the world, but also corrode it irreparably. So how can Cajal‟s young 
Investigator decide when to stop „scepticising‟? The answer is twofold. First, the approach 
presented here is fallibilist in Peirce‟s sense (see next section), but not sceptical. This means 
that, far from assuming that obtaining information about the world is impossible, one keeps 
more or less open the possibility that what appears as information might turn out to be 
disinformation, i.e. not information at all, but mere content, that applies to a different possible 
world. This is just another way of saying that Cajal‟s young Investigator should keep in mind 
that, although he is right, he might have been wrong, and has been wrong in the past. Our 
unconvinced opponent might still retort that this merely shifts the problem: how do we know 
that this is the time when we are right? And this is the other part of the answer. The objection 
is really asking for a way of understanding whether there is anything, in the best information 
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we can gather about the world, that is a clear hallmark of its truth, i.e. of its zero-Hamming 
distance with the targeted system. A full explanation would take us too far away, but I have 
argued in Floridi (2010) that such hallmark is indeed available, and it is represented by the 
commutative relation (in the category theory‟s sense of „commutation‟) between the model 
under discussion and its target, i.e., in the vocabulary of this paper, between the proximal 
access to M and the distal access toS. Theories of truth often seem to be developed with 
passive viewers of an outside world in mind, detached observers, whether inside or outside 
Plato‟s cave, TV watchers, radio listeners, movie goers, in short, systems users, according to 
the computer science terminology favoured in this paper. The correctness theory of truth, 
defended in Floridi (2010), is an attempt to cater for a different sort of customer, namely 
embodied and embedded, creative agents, who interact with reality, who shape and build it, 
Plato‟s artisans, writers not just readers, Shakespeare‟s players not mere audience, in short 
systems designers. For these agents, truth is about constructing and handling informational 
artefacts and interacting with them successfully, not merely experiencing them passively. It is 
such successful interactions that provide the much-sought-after hallmarks of truth to our 
young Investigator. When they occur, then it is time to stop scepticising.  
 
8. Conclusion: From Descartes to Peirce 
The attentive reader might have noticed that, in my treatment of radical informational 
scepticism, I have not followed a Cartesian strategy. Instead, it is rather Peirce that has 
influenced the approach developed in this paper. For Descartes, radical scepticism is a means 
of clearing the ground for the static and permanent foundations of a new „dogmatism‟, a vital 
element in the internal monologue of the single mind, and an essential step towards 
individualism and the subject‟s epistemic responsibility. For Peirce, a genuine form of doubt 
is a falsificationist means to keep the road of inquiry constantly open, a vital element in the 
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deontology of scientific communication, and an essential step towards the construction of a 
community of scientific inquirers less fallible than any of its members. The dynamic and 
multi-agent process of investigation, which permeates Peirce‟s whole philosophy, makes him 
aware of the importance and utility of a constructive form of scepticism of the sort I have 
defended above. Thus, it is thanks to a process of doubting that in The Fixation of Belief 
(Peirce (1877)) we can move from  
 the method of tenacity (dogmatically holding fast to one‟s beliefs); to  
 the method of authority (deferring to someone else the right to assess the epistemic 
value of a belief); to  
 the a priori method (the intra-subjective way of coming to the acceptance of a belief 
without taking into account either reality or other people‟s minds); to  
 the scientific method (the inter-subjective way of coming to an agreement about the 
acceptability of a belief, further constrained by reality).  
So I agree with Peirce that inquiry is really prompted only by further genuine doubts of an 
external origin, and that a constructive scepticism shows the importance of being earnest in 
the pursuit of knowledge. We should follow Peirce in rejecting absolute scepticism as an 
anthropology (Pyrrhonian blessed state of ignorance) and as an ontology (irreconcilable 
dualism, nominalism, anti-realism), while appreciating it as a deontological stance in how to 
conduct our search for information. 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to acknowledge the useful comments and criticisms by Patrick Allo, Greg 
Chaitin, Bihui Li, Giuseppe Primiero, Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson, Allan Third and Matteo 
Turilli on previous drafts of this paper. Penny Driscoll kindly copyedited the final version. 
The two anonymous reviewers of the journal provided many useful comments. All the 
40 
 
aforementioned people helped me to improve the paper substantially but they are not 
responsible for any remaining mistakes.   
 
 
References 
Abelard, P. 1976, Sic Et Non (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press). Critical 
edition by Blanche B. Boyer and Richard McKeon. 
Bar-Hillel, Y. 1951, "A Note on State-Descriptions", Philosophical Studies, 2(5), 72-75.  
Bar-Hillel, Y. 1964, Language and Information: Selected Essays on Their Theory and 
Application (Reading, Mass ; London: Addison-Wesley).  
Bar-Hillel, Y., and Carnap, R. 1953, "An Outline of a Theory of Semantic Information" repr. 
in Bar-Hillel 1964, 221-74. 
Borel, É. 1927, "À Propos De La Recente Discussion Entre M. R. Wavre Et M. P. Levy", 
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 34, 271-276.  
Carnap, R. 1951, "The Problem of Relations in Inductive Logic", Philosophical Studies, 2(5), 
75-80.  
Chaitin, G. J. 2006, Meta Maths: The Quest for Omega (London: Atlantic).  
D'Agostino, M., and Floridi, L. 2009, "The Enduring Scandal of Deduction. Is Propositional 
Logic Really Uninformative?", Synthese, 167(2), 271-315.  
Dalal, M. 1988, "Investigations into a Theory of Knowledge Base Revision: Preliminary 
Report", Proceedings of the Seventh National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
(AAAI-88), Minnesota: St. Paul, 475-479.  
Descartes, R. 1984, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. 3 vols. translated by John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press).  
41 
 
Deza, M. M., and Deza, E. 2009, Encyclopedia of Distances (New York: Springer).  
Ernvall, J., Katajainen, J., and Penttonen, M. 1985, "Np-Completeness of the Hamming 
Salesman Problem", BIT Numerical Mathematics, 25(1), 289-292.  
Floridi, L. 1998a, "The Importance of Being Earnest: Peirce‟s Interpretation of Scepticism" 
in C. S. Peirce Categories to Constantinople, edited by J. van Brakel and M. van 
Heerden (Leuven: Leuven University Press). 47-60.  
Floridi, L. 1998b, "Mathematical Scepticism: A Sketch with Historian in Foreground" in The 
Skeptical Tradition around 1800, edited by Johan van der Zande and Richard Popkin 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer). 41-60.  
Floridi, L. 2000, "Mathematical Skepticism: The Cartesian Approach" in Proceedings of the 
Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, edited by Akihiro Kanamori (Bowling 
Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr). 217-265.  
Floridi, L. 2002, Sextus Empiricus, the Recovery and Transmission of Pyrrhonism (Oxford – 
New York: Oxford University Press).  
Floridi, L. 2004a, "Mathematical Skepticism: The Debate between Hobbes and Wallis" in 
Skepticism in Renaissance and Post-Renaissance Thought: New Interpretations, 
edited by Jose Raimundo Maia Neto and Richard H. Popkin (New York: Prometheus), 
143-183.  
Floridi, L. 2004b, "Outline of a Theory of Strongly Semantic Information", Minds and 
Machines, 14(2), 197-222.  
Floridi, L. 2010, The Philosophy of Information (Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Gabbay, D. M., and Schlechta, K. 2009, Logical Tools for Handling Change in Agent-Based 
Systems (New York: Springer).  
Holm, R. 2003, "A Constructive Approach to State Description Semantics", Journal of 
Applied Logic, 1(1-2), 13-46.  
42 
 
Konstantinidis, S. 2007, "Computing the Edit Distance of a Regular Language", Information 
and Computation, 205(9), 1307-1316.  
Kracht, M., and Kutz, O. 2007, "Logically Possible Worlds and Counterpart Semantics for 
Modal Logic" in Philosophy of Logic, edited by D. Jacquette (Amsterdam: Elsevier), 
943-996.  
Kutach, D. (ed.) 2006, Special issue on "Similarity Is a Bad Guide to Counterfactual Truth". 
Available online at 
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Douglas_Kutach/Kutach_Similarity.
pdf. 
Lafage, C., and Lang, J. 2001, "Propositional Distances and Preference Representation", 
Lecture Notes In Computer Science, 2143, 48-59.  
Larkin, J. H., and Simon, H. A. 1987, "Why a Diagram Is (Sometimes) Worth Ten Thousand 
Words", Cognitive Science, 11(1), 65-100.  
Leibniz, G. W. 1951, Selections. Edited by Philip P. Wiener. (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons) 
Lewis, D. 1979, "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow", Noûs, 13(4), 455-476.  
Lewis, D. K. 1973, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).  
Mancosu, P. 1998, From Brouwer to Hilbert: The Debate on the Foundations of Mathematics 
in the 1920s (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Manthey, B., and Reischuk, R. 2005, "The Intractability of Computing the Hamming 
Distance", Theoretical Computer Science, 337(1-3), 331-346.  
Marion, M. 1998, Wittgenstein, Finitism, and the Foundations of Mathematics (Oxford: 
Clarendon).  
Naimpally, S. A., and Warrack, B. 1970, Proximity Spaces (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press).  
43 
 
Papini, O. 2000, "Knowledge-Base Revision", The Knowledge Engineering Review, 15(04), 
339-370.  
Pascal, B. 1995, Penseés and Other Writings Translated by Honor Levi, with an introduction 
and notes by Anthony Levi. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Peirce, C. S. 1877, "The Fixation of Belief", Popular Science Monthly, 12 (November ), 1-15.  
Popkin, R. H. 2003, The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle revised and 
expanded edition (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Ramón y Cajal, S. 1999, Advice for a Young Investigator Reglas y consejos sobre 
investigación cientifica (4th ed. 1916) translated by Neely Swanson and Larry W. 
Swanson. (Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press). 
Satoh, K. 1988, "Nonmonotonic Reasoning by Minimal Belief Revision", Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Fifth Generation Computer Systems, Tokyo, Japan, 455-
462.  
Simon, H. A. 1978, "On the Forms of Mental Representation" in Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. Ix: Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations 
of Psychology, edited by C. W. Savage (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 
3–18.  
Tasić, V. 2001, Mathematics and the Roots of Postmodern Thought (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press).  
Williamson, T. 1987, "Invertible Definitions", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 28(2), 
244-258.  
Yue, A., Liu, W., and Hunter, A. 2008, "Measuring the Ignorance and Degree of Satisfaction 
for Answering Queries in Imprecise Probabilistic Logic Programs", Lecture Notes In 
Computer Science, 5291, 386-400.  
 
